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Dynamical models of task organization in social insect colonies
Yun Kang1 and Guy Theraulaz 2
Abstract
The organizations of insect societies, such as division of labor, task allocation, collective regulation, mass
action responses, have been considered as main reasons for the ecological success. In this article, we propose
and study a general modeling framework that includes the following three features: (a) the average internal
response threshold for each task (the internal factor); (b) social network communications that could lead to
task switching (the environmental factor); and (c) dynamical changes of task demands (the external factor).
Since workers in many social insect species exhibit age polyethism, we also extend our model to incorporate
age polyethism in which worker task preferences change with age. We apply our general modeling framework
to the cases of two task groups: the inside colony task versus the outside colony task. Our analytical study
of the models provides important insights and predictions on the effects of colony size, social communica-
tion, and age related task preferences on task allocation and division of labor in the adaptive dynamical
environment. Our study implies that the smaller size colony invests its resource for the colony growth and
allocates more workers in the risky tasks such as foraging while the larger colony shifts more workers to
perform the safer tasks inside the colony. Social interactions among different task groups play an important
role in shaping task allocation depending on the relative cost and demands of the tasks.
Keywords: Social insects; Division of labor; Task allocations; Colony size; Social interactions
1. Introduction
Social insects such as ants, bees, wasps and termites, among the most diverse and ecologically impor-
tant organisms on earth, live in intricately governed societies that rival our own in complexity and internal
cohesion [39]. They exhibit a decentralized system of task allocation (population distribution of workers
performing different tasks), with a sophisticated division of labor (different workers specializing in subsets
of tasks performed by a colony) resulting from interactions among members of the colony and the environ-
ment. This decentralization leads to highly complex dynamics governed by many independent individual
interactions, which has advantages as compared to a hierarchical organization [15, 22, 27, 28, 55] including:
scalability where the colony is able to adjust its organizational structure, including its division of labor and
task allocations, as its size increases [56]; robustness/flexibility where the colony is able to cope with envi-
ronmental perturbations; and simplicity of the behavior of each individual in the colony. These properties
have led to an increased interest in the dynamics and organization of social insect colonies in domains outside
of biology, including network routing, optimization theory and robotics [29, 102, 115]. However, social insect
biologists face the challenge of integrating between the individual and colony levels of organization [39, 132].
Task allocation and division of labor are functionally inter-connected aspects of task organization. They
are fundamental properties of biological systems across all levels of organization, from cells to societies
1Sciences and Mathematics Faculty, College of Letters and Sciences, Arizona State University, Mesa, AZ 85212, USA
(yun.kang@asu.edu)
2Centre de Recherches sur la Cognition Animale, CNRS UMR 5169, Universite Paul Sabatier, 118 route de Narbonne, 31062
Toulouse Cedex 04, France (guy.theraulaz@univ-tlse3.fr)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier October 5, 2018
[40, 83] and are two of the most prominent features of social insect colony behavior [92, 131, 138]. Mathe-
matical models have begun to show colony-level patterns of task organizations that can result from simple
individual behavioral rules, which provide an understanding of the underlying organizational framework on
which selection can act. Classical models of colony organization have focused on the adaptive value of so-
cial structure [39, 92, 131, 136, 138]. Some recent models have focused on the mechanistic processes that
generate colony organization and behavior. More recent models treat the social insect colony as a self-
organized, decentralized system in which behavior emerges from the independent actions and decisions of
workers. Self-organization models can be used to describe numerous colony processes, including homeostasis
[13, 128], mass action responses [8, 13, 14, 25, 26, 84], and colony construction [8, 72]. However, modeling
task organizations including division of labor and task allocations is still in an early stage.
Most mechanistic models of task organization have used a simulation approach. The majority build
from the assumption that individual workers vary in their response thresholds to perform a given task
[53, 1, 100, 65, 10]. Individuals with lower thresholds are more likely to become specialists for that task.
Because individuals vary in thresholds, different group members specialize on different tasks, a division of
labor emerges [7, 53, 100, 65, 10, 74]. Recent work of Gautrais et al [43] coupled variation in response thresh-
olds with self-reinforcement, such that individuals performing a task reduce their thresholds for performing
it again. This amplifies effects of group size on specialization. Jeanson et al.[66] generated a positive effect
of group size on division of labor, from the assumption that worker availability is consistently higher than
the colony’s need for task performance. There is significant empirical support for these response threshold
models, including demonstration that individuals have intrinsic sensory thresholds for behaviors [74, 9, 95],
that variance in thresholds influences variation in task performance [74, 9, 95] and that the diversity of
individuals performing a task increases with stimulus levels [106, 107]. The self-reinforcement assumption
also matches empirical data indicating that experienced workers are more likely to perform a task again,
and to engage in it more quickly [68, 4]. An age polyethism model developed by Wakano and coworkers
[126] assumed that workers were grouped into different age classes, and each age class allocated labor in
predetermined proportions for inside (e.g., brood care) and outside (foraging) tasks. These simulations are
insightful and some of their predictions have been supported by data. However, these simulation models in
many cases involve many parameters that are difficult to measure from real data; and mathematically, they
are too complicated to track. In addition, researchers developing models independently often target different
components of the processes generating task organizations. Thus, there is a need to broaden the integra-
tive scope of these models by using developing and studying realistic and mathematical trackable models [39].
Differential equations provide a promising tool for analyzing the mechanisms underlying colony-level
patterns and dynamics such as division of labor, task allocation, and generate testable predictions about
how multiple components of colony organization interact in changing environments. These models have
been successfully applied to insect societies in colony population dynamics (e.g., [69]), colony organization
(e.g., [75, 52]), foraging (e.g., [109, 114, 124]), colony metabolic scaling (e.g., [54]), optimal decision-making
in social insect colonies (e.g., [81]) and social parasitism (e.g., [70]). The power of these models lies in
their simple mathematical formalism for describing how different interested components interact and change
through time. In this manuscript, we will use compartmental differential equations models to develop a gen-
eral framework to characterize the crucial feedback mechanisms linking social interaction, colony structure
and dynamics of task organizations in a dynamical environment, and understand potential processes of task
organization as colony size increases.
In our proposed modeling framework, both task allocation and division of labor are modeled around the
assumptions that (1) available workers perform a task when they encounter stimulus levels that match or
exceed their threshold; and (2) social interaction plays the role of information transfer in task switching
decisions that can affect task allocation. The later assumption has been supported by many models and
data that contact rates from individuals engaged in a task increase the likelihood of recruiting others into
that task. For example, in P. californicus, relative contact rates increase with worker number and density.
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In highly eusocial colonies (e.g., eusocial Hymenoptera [77, 125, 33]), variation in worker task performance
can also be generated by discrete physical castes as they age. For example, in field P. californicus colonies,
younger workers are significantly less likely to perform outside tasks, including foraging and waste manage-
ment, and are generally less likely to be outside the nest [44]. Thus, we also extend the model to include an
age polyethism, in which workers shift tasks with age.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive a general modeling frame-
work that includes genetically based variation in the stimulus levels for a task to which individual workers
respond; variation in task performance on differences in individual experience of the environment, task de-
mand (flexibility) through social network communications in the colony; and the adaptive dynamics of the
demand/resource of each task in the colony. In Section 3, we provide analytical results on the proposed
model to address how colony size and social interaction affect the task organization. In Section 4, we extend
our model to include age polyethism, and analyze the model to explore how age polyethism affects task
organization in addition to the effects of colony size and social interaction. In the last section, we discuss
the biological implications of our analytical results from our proposed models, and the potential outlook of
our current work.
2. Model derivation of task organization
In this section, we propose a general dynamical compartmental model of task organization on the colony
level that incorporates (a) genetically based variation in the stimulus levels for a task to which individual
workers respond (response thresholds [4]); (b) variation in task performance on differences in individual
experience of the environment, task demand (flexibility) through social network communications in the
colony[4, 40]; (c) dynamics of the demand/resource of each task in the colony. We assume the social insect
colony has m ≥ 2 tasks.
The proposed model with the three components mentioned above can be represented as the following set
of nonlinear compartment model:
N ′ = rN
s
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjTj
T ′i =
rNs
b+Ns
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
−∑j Djθj Ti TjN∑
k
Dk
θk
+
∑
j
Di
θi
Tj
Ti
N∑
k
Dk
θk
− µiTi
=
[∑
k
Dk
θk
]−1 [
rNs
b+Ns
Di
θi
+ Ti
N
∑
j
(
Di
θi
− Dj
θj
)
Tj − µiTi
∑
k
Dk
θk
]
D′i = γiN − αiTiDi
(1)
where
∑
i T
′
i = (
∑
i Ti)
′
= N ′. The variable N in Model (1) represents the colony size that includes all
workers performing m different tasks; Ti represents the size of workers performing task i, i = 1, 2, ..,m where
T (t) = (T1(t), T2(t), ..., Tm(t)) represents the task allocation of the colony at time t; and Di(t) is the work
demand or stimulus level of task i, i = 1, 2, ..,m. The parameter r denotes the reproduction rate of queen(s)
of the colony; b is the saturation constant; θi is the average response threshold of workers performing task i;
and µi is the average mortality of workers who perform task i.
Model (1) incorporates variance in response thresholds and experiences, thus division of labor and task
allocation become strongly influenced by the group size N =
∑m
i=1 Ti, task numberm, social communications
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among task groups
Ti
N
∑
j
(
Di
θi
−Dj
θj
)
Tj∑
k
Dk
θk
, i = 1, 2, ..,m, and the related task demand Di where these variables
showed an interaction effect [66]. More precisely, Model (1) has the following ecological assumptions:
1. The newborn workers are determined by the reproduction ability of queen(s) measured by r and the
collaborated efforts from m task groups described by N
s
b+Ns where b is the saturation constant and
s > 1 denotes that nonlinear effects of the collaboration. This modeling approach has been used for
modeling leaf-cutter ants in Kang et al [69] and for population dynamics of honeybees in [34, 71, 103].
2. The death rate of task group i, denoted by µi, should be a nonlinear function of the size of task group
i and the total colony size N . For simplicity, we assume µi is a constant and measures that average
mortality of workers performing task i.
3. The demand of task i of the colony, denoted by Di, is determined by the following two factors: (1) The
demand γiN is an increasing function of the colony size where γi represents the increase in demand
intensity per unit time for task i. (2) The depletion of demand αiTiDi is an increasing function of the
demand Di and the size of task group Ti where αi denotes the average performance efficiency of the
task group i. This modeling approach is adopted from Theraulaz et al [116].
4. The population size of task group i is determined by the following two factors in addition to its natural
mortality rate µi:
• The relative competition ability of task group i is measured by
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
where Dk
θk
is the competi-
tion ability of task group k. The term
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
describes that the higher demand Dk and the lower
response threshold θk of task k provide the higher competition ability of workers in task group k,
therefore, as a consequence, Tk is expected to have a higher recruitment rate of new workers.
• The task switching rate between task groups is determined by their relative competition ability
of task group and the task allocation at time t, i.e.:
The rate of worker in task group i switching to other task group j(6= i):
fTij = Ti︸︷︷︸
size of task group i
Tj
N︸︷︷︸
probability to meet task group j
Dj
θj∑
k
Dk
θk︸ ︷︷ ︸
the relative competition ability of task group j
where
Dj
θj
Tj
N∑
k
Dk
θk
describes the probability of workers performing task i switching to task group j.
Therefore, the social network communication matrix {fTij}mi,j=1 contributes the task alloca-
tion due to communication such as social antennation contacts in social ants.
The proposed general model (1) incorporates both variation in task performance among workers and
individual worker flexibility. The decision of an individual worker performing a task depends on both the
internal factors (e.g., the varied thresholds for different tasks) and the external factors (e.g., task needs
from the environment, or worker-worker interactions that communicate task needs). Thus, the dynamical
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outcomes of Model (1) are expected to predict how colonies allocate workers in relation to the need for each
task and adjust the allocation in response to environmental changes through the social network commu-
nication matrix {fTij}mi,j=1 as colony grows.
For convenience, let xi =
Ti
N
, then we have
dxi
dt
= dTi
Ndt
− TidN
N2dt
= dTi
Ndt
− xidN
Ndt
= rN
s−1
b+Ns
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
−∑j Djθj TiN TjN∑
k
Dk
θk
+
∑
j
Di
θi
Tj
N
Ti
N∑
k
Dk
θk
− µi TiN − xi rN
s−1
1+aNs + xi
∑m
j=1 µj
Tj
N
= rN
s−1
b+Ns
[
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
− xi
]
+ xi
[∑
j
Di
θi
xj∑
k
Dk
θk
−∑j Djθj xj∑
k
Dk
θk
]
− µixi + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj
which gives follows
dxi
dt
= rN
s−1
b+Ns
[
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
− xi
]
+
xi
[∑
j
Di
θi
xj−
∑
j
Dj
θj
xj
]
∑
k
Dk
θk
− µixi + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj
= rN
s−1
b+Ns
[
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
− xi
]
+
xi
[
Di
θi
−∑j Djθj xj
]
∑
k
Dk
θk
− µixi + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj
where xi(0) ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i xi(0) = 1. Therefore, the model (1) can be rewritten as the following equations
by letting xi =
Ti
N
, i = 1, ...,m:
N ′ = rN
s
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxjN = N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxj
]
dxi
dt
= rN
s−1
b+Ns
[
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
− xi
]
+
xi
[
Di
θi
−∑j Djθj xj
]
∑
k
Dk
θk
− µixi + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj
D′i = γiN − αiTiDi = γiN − αixiNDi = N [γi − αixiDi]
. (2)
Notice that xi(0) ∈ [0, 1],
∑
i xi(0) = 1 and
∑
i
dxi
dt
= 0 for all future time t, thus, we can conclude that the
task allocation X = (x1, x2, ..., xm) has the properties of xi(t) ∈ [0, 1], and
∑
i xi(t) = 1 for all future time
t. In the rest of this article, we will explore the following questions by studying the dynamics of the model (2):
1. How does the colony size N affect the task allocation X?
2. How does the network communication matrix {fTij}mi,j=1 affect the task allocation X?
3. Mathematical analysis
Let S = {∑mi=1 xi = 1 : 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1}. Then Ω = R+ × S × Rm+ is the state space of the model (2). To
continue our study, we first define
f(N,µ) = µ(b+Ns)− rNs−1, Nc(µ) = r(s− 1)
µs
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and assume that
µ1 ≤ µ2 ≤ · · · ≤ µi ≤ · · · ≤ µm.
First, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 (Existence of positive roots). Assume s > 1. If f(Nc(µm), µm) < 0, then there exists
N±1 , N
±
m such that f(N
±
1 , µ1) = f(N
±
m, µm) = 0, and the following inequalities hold
N−1 < Nc(µ1) < N
+
1 , N
−
m < Nc(µm) < N
+
m, N
−
1 < N
−
m < N
+
m ≤ N+1 .
Notes: Applying Lemma 3.1, we could conclude that if s = 2 and
(
r
µm
)2
> 4b, then we have
f(Nc(µm), µm) < 0 and N
±
1 =
r ±
√
r2 − 4bµ21
2µ1
> 0, N±m =
r ±
√
r2 − 4bµ2m
2µm
> 0.
Define Condition H as follows:
H: s > 1, f(Nc(µm), µm) < 0 and N(0) > N
−
m.
Now we have our first theorem regarding the model (2) as follows:
Theorem 3.1 (Basic dynamical properties). Assume that all parameters are strictly positive and Con-
dition H holds. Then the model (2) is positively invariant and bounded in Ω. More specifically, we have
N+m ≤ lim inf
t→∞
N(t) ≤ lim sup
t→∞
N(t) ≤ N+1 and
γi
αi
≤ lim inf
t→∞
Di(t) ≤ DM for any i = 1, ..,m.
If N(0) < N−1 , then we have lim inft→∞N(t) = 0.
Notes: Theorem 3.1 suggests that our model (2) is well defined biologically, and the allocation of task i
and its related demand Di are persistent under condition that the colony is established successfully, i.e., the
colony size N is also persistent provided that Condition H is satisfied.
According to the model (2), if (N,X,D) is its equilibrium where X = (x1, ..., xm), D = (D1, ..., Dm),
then it satisfies the following equations:
0 = γi − αixiDi ⇒ Di = γiαixi ,
∑
k
Dk
θk
=
∑
k
γk
αkθkxk
and
∑
k
Dkxk
θk
=
∑
k
γk
αkθk
0 = rN
s−1
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxj ⇒ rN
s−1
b+Ns =
∑m
j=1 µjxj
0 = rN
s−1
b+Ns
[
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
− xi
]
+
xi
[
Di
θi
−∑j Djθj xj
]
∑
k
Dk
θk
− µixi + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj
(3)
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which give the follows
0 =
[∑m
j=1 µjxj
] [ Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
− xi
]
+
xi
[
Di
θi
−∑j Djθj xj
]
∑
k
Dk
θk
− µixi + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj , ⇒
0 =
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
[∑m
j=1 µjxj + xi
]
− xi
[
µi
∑
k
Dk
θk
+
∑
j
Dj
θj
xj
]
∑
k
Dk
θk
0 = Di
θi
[∑m
j=1 µjxj + xi
]
− xi
[
µi
∑
k
Dk
θk
+
∑
j
Dj
θj
xj
]
0 = γi
αiθixi
[∑m
j=1 µjxj + xi
]
− xi
[∑
j
γj
αjθj
(
µi
xj
+ 1
)]
. (4)
Therefore, we are able to solve the task allocation X = (x1, .., xm) from the following equations
γi
αiθixi

 m∑
j=1
µjxj + xi

− xi

∑
j
γj
αjθj
(
µi
xj
+ 1
) = 0 and m∑
k=1
xk = 1, for any i = 1, ..,m (5)
which allow us to solve D and N from Di =
γi
αixi
and rN
s−1
b+Ns =
∑m
j=1 µjxj , respectively. Define Dˆi =
γi
θiαi
as
a measure of a relative demand of task i, then the discussion above gives the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. [Equilibrium] If (N∗, X∗, D∗) is an equilibrium of Model (2) where X∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
m), D
∗ =
(D∗1 , ..., D
∗
m), then it satisfies the following equations:[∑m
j=1 µjx
∗
j + x
∗
i
]
= x∗i
[∑
j
Dˆj
Dˆi
(
µix
∗
i
x∗j
+ x∗i
)]
and
∑m
i=k x
∗
k = 1, for any i = 1, ..,m
D∗i =
γi
αix
∗
i
and r(N
∗)s−1
b+(N∗)s =
∑m
j=1 µjx
∗
j
(6)
Notes: The solution X of (6) determines by two parts: social interactions and the recruitment rate from
the relative competitive ability, i.e., the equation
[∑m
j=1 µjx
∗
j + x
∗
i
]
= x∗i
[∑
j
Dˆj
Dˆi
(
µix
∗
i
x∗j
+ x∗i
)]
could be
represented as follows:
[(∑m
j=1 µjx
∗
j
)
− x∗i
(∑
j
Dˆj
Dˆi
µix
∗
i
x∗j
)]
= x∗i



∑
j
Dˆj
Dˆi

x∗i − 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contribution from social interactions
.
The modeling framework of the model (2) allows us investigate the following two scenarios:
1. How the size of a colony N affects the task allocation X . Since we assume that µm = max1<i<m{µi}
and µ1 = min1<i<m{µi} , then According to Lemma 3.2, we know that
m∑
j=1
µjx
∗
j = µm −
m−1∑
j=1
(µm − µj)x∗j = µ1 +
m∑
j=2
(µj − µ1)x∗j .
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Define Φ(N∗) = r(N
∗)s−1
b+(N∗)s , then we have
Φ(N∗) =
r(N∗)s−1
b+ (N∗)s
=
m∑
j=1
µjx
∗
j = µm −
m−1∑
j=1
(µm − µj)x∗j = µ1 +
m∑
j=2
(µj − µ1)x∗j . (7)
If we assume that the time scale of the population dynamics of N is much slower than the time scale of
the task allocation xi and the dynamics of demand Di, then we could let the total population N
∗ be
a constant when we investigate the task allocation X at a faster time scale. According to (7), we can
see that for a fixed population N∗, the value of Φ(N∗) could be increasing or decreasing with respect
to x∗i depending on its corresponding mortality. We will come back to this topic when we apply our
model to a two-task situation in the following subsection.
2. How social antennation interactions among task groups, i.e., the social network communication
matrix {fTij}mi,j=1, affects the task allocationX . To investigate this, we will compare the task allocation
X of the model (2) to the case when there is no such effects which is the following model:
N ′ = rN
s
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxjN = N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxj
]
dxi
dt
= rN
s−1
1+aNs
[
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
− xi
]
− µixi + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj
D′i = γiN − αiTiDi = γiN − αixiNDi = N [γi − αixiDi]
(8)
whose task allocation X∗ follows the following equation based on the similar discussions from Lemma
3.2: ∑m
j=1 µjx
∗
j = x
∗
i
∑
j
Dˆj
Dˆi
µix
∗
i
x∗j
and
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i = 1, i = 1, ..,m . (9)
3.1. Application to the two task groups: the outside colony task versus the inside colony task
To continue our study, we focus on the case when s = 2 and m = 2, i.e., two tasks groups (the outside
colony task versus the inside colony task). It is nature to assume that the mortality of the outside colony task
µ2 such as foraging is larger than the inside colony task µ1 such as brood care. Then x1 is the task alloca-
tion for the inside colony task. This gives x2 = 1−x1 which is the task allocation for the outside colony task.
According to Lemma 3.2 (also see equations (3), (4), and (5)), we have the following equations of the
interior equilibrium (N,X,D) of Model (2) when s = 2 and m = 2:
rN
b+N2
= µ1x1 + µ2(1− x1), D1 = γ1
α1x1
, D2 =
γ2
α2(1− x1) ,
and [1− x1] [(1 + µ1 − µ2)x1 + µ2] = x1
[
µ1
(
1 +
(
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
− 1
)
x1
)
+ x1(1 − x1)
(
1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)]
which gives
[1− x1]2 = µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 +
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution from social interactions
. (10)
Now we have the following theorem:
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Theorem 3.2 (Task allocation). Let s = m = 2, µ1 < µ2, and assume that Condition H holds. Then
the model (2) has two interior equilibria (N∗±, X
∗, D∗) =
(
r±
√
r2−4bµ2
2µ , x
∗
1, 1− x∗1, γ1x∗1α1 ,
γ2
(1−x∗1)α2
)
where
µ = µ1x
∗
1+µ2(1−x∗1), and x∗1 ∈ (0, 1) which is the positive root of (10). Moreover, the following statements
hold:
1. The equilibrium (N∗−, X
∗, D∗) is unstable, and the population N∗± are in the following intervals:
N∗+ ∈
(
r +
√
r2 − 4bµ22
2µ2
,
r +
√
r2 − 4bµ21
2µ1
)
and N∗− ∈
(
r −
√
r2 − 4bµ21
2µ1
,
r −
√
r2 − 4bµ22
2µ2
)
.
In addition, N∗+ is an increasing function of x
∗
1, while it is a decreasing function of x
∗
2, µ1,
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, respec-
tively.
2. The allocation of the inside colony task x∗1 is greater than the critical value xˆ1 where
xˆ1 =
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
(1 + µ1) + 2−
√
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
2
(1 + µ1)2 + 4
µ1Dˆ2
Dˆ1
2(1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
<
1
1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
∈ (0, 1).
3. The allocation of the inside colony task x∗1 is increasing with respect to
Dˆ1
Dˆ2
, µ2, respectively, and x
∗
1 is
decreasing with respect to its average mortality rate µ1.
Notes: Theorem 3.2 provides important insights on the long-term dynamics (i.e., matured) of the task
organization in social insect colonies, provided that Condition H holds. Both theoretical results and nu-
merical simulations (not show here) suggest that the model (2) has two interior equilibria (N∗±, X
∗, D∗)
where (N∗−, X
∗, D∗) is a saddle and (N∗+, X
∗, D∗) is a sink. There is a threshold Nc between N∗− and N
∗
+
where, biologically, the smaller population size N (e.g., N ∈ (N∗−, Nc)) indicates that the colony is at the
early ergonomic growth stage which is highly unstable (see Kang et al [69] and Clark and Fewell [20]).
When the colony size is larger than the threshold Nc, then the colony size approaches to the matured size
N∗+ =
r+
√
r2−4bµ2
2µ where µ = µ1x
∗
1 + µ2(1 − x∗1) = µ2 − (µ2 − µ1)x∗1 = µ1 + (µ2 − µ1)x∗2. According to
Theorem 3.2, N∗+ is decreasing with respect to the allocation of the outside colony task x
∗
2 and is increasing
with respect to the allocation of the inside colony task x∗1. This result suggests that the matured colony
distributes more allocation to the inside colony task distribution x∗1 (e.g., invests more in less risky task)
as its size increases. Theorem 3.2 also implies that the average mortality and the related colony demand
can have huge influences on a social insect colony size since the population size of the matured colony is
decreasing with respect to the mortality of the inside colony task µ1 and the relative demand of the inside
colony task Dˆ2
Dˆ1
. More detailed discussion on the effects of the colony size will be presented in the next
subsection.
In the case that ConditionH does not hold, the model (2) can still have the stable equilibrium (N∗+, X
∗, D∗)
under restriction that x∗1 should be greater than certain threshold x
c
1. The existence of N
∗
+ requires that
µ1 <
r
2
√
b
and µ = µ1x
∗
1+µ2(1−x∗1) < r2√b which implies that 1 > x∗1 > xc1 =
r
2
√
b
−µ2
µ1−µ2 where x
∗
1 is the unique
positive root of the equation (10). In the case that x∗1 < x
c
1 which is equivalent to x
∗
2 > 1 − xc1, the colony
collapses. This implies that if the mortality of the outside colony task such as foraging is too high, then the
colony should restrict the allocation to this task under certain threshold for survival while the allocation of
the inside colony task should be above certain threshold to maintain the colony.
9
In addition, Theorem 3.2 provides insights on how the relative demand and the mortality of tasks would
affect the task allocation. The theorem implies that the inside colony task allocation x∗1 should be above a
threshold xˆ1 =
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
(1+µ1)+2−
√
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
2
(1+µ1)2+4
µ1Dˆ2
Dˆ1
2(1+
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
which is determined by its task mortality µ1 and the relative
task demand Dˆ2
Dˆ1
. The threshold xˆ1 is decreasing with respect to
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
and µ1, respectively. This suggests that
increasing the values of Dˆ2
Dˆ1
or µ1 could potentially decrease the inside task allocation x
∗
1 as the task allocation
is closely regulated by the colony demand and its mortality. This confirms our second results of Theorem
3.2, i.e., the allocation of the inside colony task x∗1 is increasing with respect to
Dˆ1
Dˆ2
, µ2, respectively, however
x∗1 is decreasing with respect to µ1. These analytical results could have the following profound biological
implications:
1. When the value of Dˆ2
Dˆ1
increases, this implies that the colony has higher demand of the outside task
such as foraging, thus the colony would distribute more workers to the outside colony task x∗2 = 1−x∗1
despite that this task has a higher mortality. The consequence is that the colony would decrease the
allocation to the inside colony task x∗1
2. When the value of the average mortality rate of the inside colony task µ1 increases, the colony experi-
ences more cost to distribute workers to this task. To optimize the investment of the colony, the colony
would decrease the distribution to the inside colony task.
3. When the value of the average mortality rate of the outside colony task µ2 increases, the colony ex-
periences more cost to distribute workers to the outside colony task, thus the colony will increase the
worker distribution to the inside colony task to optimize the energy investment.
3.2. Effects of the colony size N
In the previous subsection, under the assumption that population dynamics N occur at the comparable
time scale of the task allocation, the results of Theorem 3.2 provide important insights on the relationship
between the long-term task allocation dynamics and the long-term population dynamics when the colony
is matured (i.e., the population is above certain threshold). In this subsection, we assume that the time
scale of the population dynamics of N is much slower than the time scale of the task allocation xi and the
dynamics of the demand Di. Thus, we could let the total population N be a constant. According to (7), we
can conclude that the task allocation X∗ satisfies the following equations:
Φ(N∗) = r(N
∗)s−1
b+(N∗)s = µ2 − (µ2 − µ1)x∗1 = µ1 + (µ2 − µ1)x∗2
x∗1 =
µ2−Φ(N∗)
µ2−µ1
x∗2 =
Φ(N∗)−µ1
µ2−µ1
provided that µ1 < Φ(N
∗) < µ2.
. (11)
Notice that there exists a threshold Nc =
√
b, such that Φ(N) = rN
b+N2 is increasing with respect to
N if N < Nc while it is decreasing if N > Nc. For a given population size N
∗ such that the condition
µ1 < Φ(N
∗) < µ2 holds, then we have the following equalities:
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∂x∗1
∂N∗ =
− ∂Φ(N∗)
∂N∗
µ2−µ1
∂x∗2
∂N∗ =
∂Φ(N∗)
∂N∗
µ2−µ1
provided that µ1 < Φ(N
∗) < µ2.
(12)
which indicates that
∂x∗1
∂N∗
< 0 when N∗ < Nc;
∂x∗1
∂N∗
> 0 when N∗ > Nc
and
∂x∗2
∂N∗
> 0 when N∗ < Nc;
∂x∗2
∂N∗
< 0 when N∗ > Nc.
Recall that x∗1 is the allocation of the inside colony task such as brood care with the smaller mortality rate
and x∗2 is the allocation of the outside colony task such as foraging with the larger mortality rate. We can
conclude that the colony size has important effects on the task allocation. There exists a threshold size
Nc =
√
b: when the colony size is below this threshold, the allocation of the outside colony task such as
foraging increases with the colony size. However, if the colony size is above this threshold, the allocation of
the outside colony task decreases with the colony size. From biological point of view, we could consider this
threshold Nc is a population size that determines the stage of the colony:
1. If the colony size is less than this threshold, i.e., N < Nc, the colony is at the early ergonomic growth
stage where the colony invests its resource for the colony growth. Thus, the colony requires more
workers to perform the outside colony task such as foraging to support the growth need of the colony.
2. If the colony size is larger than this threshold, i.e., N > Nc, the colony is at the matured stage where
the colony invests its resource for the mantainence of the colony. During this stage, the colony shits
workers that perform the outside colony task to perform the safer task, i.e., the inside colony task,
such as brood care to take care new queens and drone. Thus, the allocation of the outside colony task
is expected to be decreasing with respect the colony size.
Our analytical results are supported by empirical findings. For example, in colonies of the common black
garden ant, Lasius niger, reduced the proportion of the colony that foraged as colony size increased [50]. In
harvest ant colonies, it is found that larger colonies increased allocation to less risky activities such as trash
removal instead of more risky task such as foraging [58]. When honey bee colonies were manipulated to re-
duce worker numbers, they immediately increased pollen collection (foraging food for brood), and increased
the number of brood being reared [110].
3.3. Effects of social interactions among task groups
Assume that social interactions (such as antennation in ants) among task groups {fTij}mi,j=1 do not con-
tribute to the task allocation (i.e., the model (8)), then the task allocation X∗ when s = m = 2 satisfies the
following equation according to (9) and (10):
[1− x1]2 = µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 .
The task allocation x∗1 of Model (8) without social communications can be described as the following
lemma:
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Lemma 3.3 (Task allocation without the contribution of social antennation interactions ). Let s =
m = 2, µ1 < µ2, and assume that Condition H holds. Then the model (8) has a unique task allocation
X∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) =

 1
1+
√
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
,
√
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
1+
√
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1

. Moreover, the following statements hold:
1. If µ1
µ2
> Dˆ1
Dˆ2
holds, then the allocation of the inside task x∗1 of the model (8) is smaller than its allocation
of the outside task x∗2.
2. If µ1
µ2
< Dˆ1
Dˆ2
holds, then the allocation of the inside task x∗1 of the model (8) is larger than its allocation
of the outside task x∗2.
Notes: The proof of Lemma 3.3 can be obtained through solving x∗1 from the following equation:
[1− x1]2 = µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 .
Lemma 3.3 implies that if social interactions do not contribute to the task allocation, then the task allocation
is totally determined by the ratio of the relative mortality µ1
µ2
to the relative task demand Dˆ1
Dˆ2
, i.e., the inside
colony task allocation is 1
1+
√√√√
µ1
µ2
Dˆ1
Dˆ2
. This ratio could be considered as the relative cost of the inside colony
task, thus the larger the ratio, the smaller allocation to the inside colony task.
How social interactions regulate the task allocation: If social interactions do contribute to the task
allocation, i.e., the full model (2), then the allocation of the inside colony task x∗1 is determined by the
equation (10), i.e.,
[1− x1]2 = µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 +
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution from social interactions
⇒
x22 =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 +
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution from social interactions
where the contribution of social interactions to the task allocation follows the following expression:
SI(x1) =
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1
]
(13)
which implies that
SI(x1) > 0 when 1 > x1 >
1
1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
; SI(x1) < 0 when x1 <
1
1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
.
Define xNS1 =
1
1+
√
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
as the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (8) that has
no contribution from social interactions; xSI1 =
1
1+
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
as a threshold determining the effects from social
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interactions SI(x1); and x
R
1 as the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (2) that has
contributions from social interactions. Then we have the following theorem regarding the effects of social
interactions to the task allocation:
Theorem 3.3 (The contribution of social interactions to the task allocation ). Let s = m = 2, µ1 < µ2,
and assume that Condition H holds. Then the following statements hold:
1. If µ1
µ2
> Dˆ2
Dˆ1
holds, then the allocation of the inside task xNS1 of the model (8) without social interactions
is smaller than the allocation of the inside task xR1 of the model (2) with social interactions, i.e.,
xNS1 < x
R
1 < x
SI
1 .
2. If µ1
µ2
< Dˆ2
Dˆ1
holds, then the allocation of the inside task xNS1 of the model (8) without social interactions
is larger than the allocation of the inside task xR1 of the model (2) with social interactions, i.e.,
xSI1 < x
R
1 < x
NS
1 .
Notes: Theorem 3.3 implies that the effect of social interactions is determined by
µ1
µ2
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
= µ1Dˆ1
µ2Dˆ2
which is the
ratio of the product of the mortality and the relative demand of the inside colony task to the product of the
mortality and the relative demand of the inside colony task:
1. If the ratio µ1Dˆ1
µ2Dˆ2
is greater than 1, i.e. µ1
µ2
> Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, then social interactions would regulate the outside
colony workers back to the colony to perform the inside colony task. Note that µ1 < µ2, thus we have
the relative demand of the outside colony task is less than the inside colony task, Dˆ2
Dˆ1
< 1. Therefore,
social interactions among workers could rearrange more workers for the inside colony task to satisfy
its demand.
2. If the ratio µ1Dˆ1
µ2Dˆ2
is less than 1, i.e. µ1
µ2
< Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, then social interactions would regulate more workers to
perform the outside colony task due to the large relative demand Dˆ2
Dˆ1
of the outside colony task.
4. The task organization model with temporal polyethism
Temporal polyethism is ubiquitous among eusocial insect colonies [132]. It is a mechanism of task allo-
cation where tasks in a colony are allocated among workers based on their age. In general, newly emerged
workers perform less ricky tasks within the nest, such as brood care and nest maintenance, and progress
to more risky tasks outside the nest, such as foraging, nest defense, and corpse removal as they age. For
example, in honeybees, the youngest workers (from about 1-3 days) exclusively clean cells. From about 3-11
days, workers perform tasks related to brood care and nest maintenance. From 11-20 days, they transition
to receiving and storing food from foragers, and at about 20 days workers begin to forage [108]. Similar
temporal polyethism patterns can be seen in primitive species of wasps and many species of ants where young
workers feed larvae, and then transition to nest building tasks, followed by foraging [89, 59]. However, this
pattern is not rigid. Workers of certain ages have strong tendencies to perform certain tasks, but may switch
to other tasks through social interactions when the stimulus of other tasks are high. For instance, removing
young workers from the nest of the ant Pheidole dentata will cause foragers, especially younger foragers, to
revert to tasks such as caring for brood [86]
There are limited mathematical models on task organizations of social insect colonies with temporal
polyethism (but see [126]). In this section, we extend the model (1) to the following model (14) to incorporate
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temporal polyethism:
N ′ = rN
s
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjTj
T ′1 =
rN2
b+N2 +
T1
N
∑
j
(
D1
θ1
−Dj
θj
)
Tj∑
k
Dk
θk
− (µ1 + β12)T1
T ′i = βi−1iTi−1 +
Ti
N
∑
j
(
Di
θi
−Dj
θj
)
∑
k
Dk
θk
Tj − [µi + βii+1]Ti, 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
T ′m = βm−1mTm−1 +
Tm
N
∑
j
(
Dm
θm
−Dj
θj
)
∑
k
Dk
θk
Tj − µ1Tm,
D′i = γiN − αiTiDi.
(14)
The modeling assumptions are similar to the model (1) introduced in Section 2, except that we assume that
newborn workers are born in the task status i = 1, e.g, brood care, with the rate rN
2
b+N2 while the population
size of the task group i ≥ 2 is determined by the maturation rate βi−1i from the task group i− 1 to the task
group i. Let xi =
Ti
N
, the model (14) can be rewritten as follows:
N ′ = N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxj
]
x′1 =
rNs−1
b+Ns + x1
∑
j
(
D1
θ1
−Dj
θj
)
xj∑
k
Dk
θk
− (µ1 + β1,2)x1 − x1 rNs−1b+Ns + x1
∑m
j=1 µjxj
x′i = βi−1,ixi−1 + xi
∑
j
(
Di
θi
−Dj
θj
)
∑
k
Dk
θk
xj − (µi + βi,i+1)xi − xi rNs−1b+Ns + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj , 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
x′m = βm−1,mxm−1 + xm
∑
j
(
Dm
θm
−Dj
θj
)
∑
k
Dk
θk
xj − µmxm − xm rNs−1b+Ns + xm
∑m
j=1 µjxj ,
D′i = N [γi − αixiDi]
. (15)
Define Dˆi =
γi
αiθi
, then we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Basic dynamical properties with age structure related DOL). Assume that all parameters
are strictly positive and Condition H holds. Then the model (15) is positively invariant and bounded in Ω.
More specifically, we have
N+m ≤ lim inf
t→∞
N(t) ≤ lim sup
t→∞
N(t) ≤ N+1 and
γi
αi
≤ lim inf
t→∞
Di(t) ≤ DM .
If N(0) < N−1 , then we have lim inft→∞N(t) = 0. Moreover, if (N
∗, X∗, D∗) is an equilibrium of Model
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(15) where X∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
m), D
∗ = (D∗1 , ..., D
∗
m), then it satisfies the following equations:
D∗i =
γi
αix
∗
i
and r(N
∗)s−1
b+(N∗)s =
∑m
j=1 µjx
∗
j
[∑m
j=1 µjx
∗
j
]
− x∗1 [µ1 + β1,2] =
x∗1(
∑
j Dˆj)−Dˆ1∑
k
Dˆk
x∗
k
x∗i−1
x∗i
=
[
µi+βi,i+1
βi−1i
+
(
∑
j Dˆj)−
Dˆ1
x∗
i
βi−1,i
∑
k
Dˆk
x∗
k
]
, 1 < i ≤ m− 1
x∗m−1
x∗m
=
[
µm
βm−1,m
+
(
∑
j Dˆj)− Dˆmx∗m
βm−1,m
∑
k
Dˆk
x∗
k
]
and
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i = 1, i = 1, ..,m
(16)
Notes: The proof of Theorem 4.1 is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, thus we omit the
details. In the case that social interactions do not contribute to the task organization, then Model (15) is
reduced to the following one:
N ′ = N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxj
]
x′1 =
rNs−1
b+Ns − (µ1 + β12)x1 − x1 rN
s−1
b+Ns + x1
∑m
j=1 µjxj
x′i = βi−1ixi−1 − (µi + βi,i+1)xi − xi rN
s−1
b+Ns + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj , 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
x′m = βm−1mxm−1 − µmxm − xm rN
s−1
b+Ns + xm
∑m
j=1 µjxj
D′i = N [γi − αixiDi]
, (17)
whose equilibrium (N∗, X∗, D∗) satisfies the following equations:
D∗i =
Dˆi
x∗i
, Φ(N∗) =
∑m
j=1 µjx
∗
j = (µ1 + β12)x
∗
1 and
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i = 1
x∗1 =
Φ(N∗)
µ1+β12
, x∗i = x
∗
1
∏i
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
, i ≤ m− 1, x∗m = βm−1,mx
∗
1
µm
∏m−1
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
(18)
where Φ(N∗) = r(N
∗)s−1
b+(N∗)s . This gives the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. [Equilibrium] If (N∗, X∗, D∗) is an equilibrium of Model (17) where X∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
m), D
∗ =
(D∗1 , ..., D
∗
m), then it satisfies the following equations:
x∗1 =
1
1+
βm−1,m
µm
∏m−1
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
+
∑m−1
i=2
(∏
i
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
)
Φ(N∗) = µ1+β1,2
1+
βm−1,m
µm
∏m−1
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
+
∑m−1
i=2
(∏
i
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
)
D∗i =
Dˆi
x∗i
, x∗i = x
∗
1
∏i
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
, i ≤ m− 1, x∗m = βm−1,mx
∗
1
µm
∏m−1
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
(19)
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Notes: Since
∑
i x
∗
i = 1, then the equations (18) imply that∑m
i=1 x
∗
i = x
∗
1
[
1 +
βm−1,m
µm
∏m−1
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
+
∑m−1
i=2
(∏i
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
)]
= 1
x∗1 =
1
1+
βm−1,m
µm
∏m−1
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
+
∑m−1
i=2
(∏
i
k=2
βk−1,k
µk+βk,k+1
)
.
In the following section, we focus on the case when s = 2 and m = 2.
4.1. Application to the allocation of the outside colony task and the inside colony task
In the rest of the section, we focus on the case when s = 2 and m = 2, i.e., two tasks groups (the outside
colony task versus the inside colony task). Without loss of generality, we let x1 be the task allocation for
the inside colony task such as brood care. This gives x2 = 1− x1 which is the task allocation for the outside
colony task such as foraging. In general, the younger workers perform the inside colony task that has a lower
mortality rate that the older workers who perform the outside colony task due to predation, whether, etc.
It is natural to assume that µ1 < µ2.
For s = 2,m = 2, then according to Theorem 4.1, the task allocation for the inside colony task x∗1 satisfies
the following equations:
[µ2 + (µ1 − µ2)x1]− x1 [µ1 + β12] = x1(1−x1)[x1(
∑
j Dˆj)−Dˆ1]
Dˆ1(1−x1)+Dˆ2x1
[µ2 + (µ1 − µ2)x1 − x1 (µ1 + β12)]
[
Dˆ1(1− x1) + Dˆ2x1
]
= x1(1− x1)
[
x1
(
Dˆ1 + Dˆ2
)
− Dˆ1
]
[µ2 − (β12 + µ2)x1]
[
1− x1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
x1
]
= x1(1 − x1)
[
x1
(
1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
− 1
]
which gives the following equation:
(1− x1)2 = β12Dˆ2
Dˆ1µ2
x21 +
x1(1−x1)
µ2


(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
social interaction
+β12 − Dˆ2µ2
Dˆ1

 . (20)
Recall that the task allocation x∗1 of the model without age structure (2) satisfies the following equation:
[1− x1]2 = µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 +
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution from social interactions
.
This implies follows the task allocation of Model (15) does not depend on the mortality of the inside colony
task µ1, instead, the maturation rate β1,2 from the inside colony task group to the outside colony task group,
the mortality of the outside colony task µ2, and the relative demand of the outside colony task
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
have
important effects. Now we claim the following theorem:
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Theorem 4.2 (Task allocation). Let s = m = 2, µ1 < µ2, and assume that Condition H holds. Then
the model (15) has two interior equilibria (N∗±, X
∗, D∗) =
(
r±
√
r2−4bµ2
2µ , x
∗
1, 1− x∗1, γ1x∗1α1 ,
γ2
(1−x∗1)α2
)
where
µ = µ1x
∗
1+µ2(1−x∗1), and x∗1 ∈ (0, 1) which is the positive root of (20). Moreover, the following statements
hold:
1. The equilibrium (N∗−, X
∗, D∗) is unstable, the total population N∗± are in the following intervals:
N∗+ ∈
(
r +
√
r2 − 4bµ22
2µ2
,
r +
√
r2 − 4bµ21
2µ1
)
and N∗− ∈
(
r −
√
r2 − 4bµ21
2µ1
,
r −
√
r2 − 4bµ22
2µ2
)
.
In addition, N∗+ is an increasing function of x
∗
1, while it is a decreasing function of x
∗
2, β1,2, µ1, respec-
tively.
2. If β1,2 < 1 +
µ2Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, then the allocation of the inside colony task x∗1 is greater than the critical value xˆ1
where xˆ1 =
a1−
√
a21−4a0
2 ∈ (0, 1) with
a1 = 1+
Dˆ2(µ2+β1,2)
Dˆ1
+ 1− β1,2
1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, a0 =
1 + µ2Dˆ2
Dˆ1
− β1,2
1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
.
3. The allocation of the inside colony task x∗1 is decreasing with respect to β1,2. If β1,2 > 1 +
µ2Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, then
x∗1 is increasing with respect to µ2.
Notes: The maturation rate β1,2 from the inside colony task group to the outside colony task group could
be considered as the additional “death” rate of the inside colony task group and the birth rate of the outside
colony task group. Theorem 4.2 implies that the relative small value of β1,2 (e.g., β1,2 < 1 +
µ2Dˆ2
Dˆ1
) can
guarantee the inside task allocation x∗1 above some threshold xˆ1, however, if β1,2 is too large, then the inside
task allocation x∗1 would be very small since it is decreasing with respect to β1,2. These theoretical results
suggest that the timing of worker maturation may be important in shaping various aspects of task organi-
zations. For example, the empirical study of honey bees by Giray et al [45] support that faster individual
behavioral development may result in a larger force of foragers and a smaller force of nurse. In addition,
Theorem 4.2 indicates that when the maturation rate β1,2 is large, then increasing the average mortality of
the outside colony task can increase the inside colony task allocation. Its biological implication is that the
colony will regulate the outside colony workers back to the colony to perform less risky work when the cost
of the outside colony task is too high.
Effects of the colony size N : Similar to our discussion provided in Section 3.1 and 3.2, the matured
colony (i.e., the size is above a threshold) distributes more allocation to the inside colony task distribution
x∗1 (e.g., invests more in less risky task) as its size increases, while the early stage colony (i.e., the size is
below a threshold) allocate more force to the outside colony task distribution x∗2 for growth. In addition, the
matured colony is decreasing with respect to the mortality of the inside colony task µ1 and the maturation
rate β1,2.
4.2. Effects of social interactions among task groups
Assume that social interactions (such as antennation in ants) among task groups {fTij}mi,j=1 do not
contribute to the task allocation (i.e., the model (17)), then the task allocation X∗ = (x∗1, 1 − x∗2) =
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(
µ2
β1,2+µ2
,
β1,2
β1,2+µ2
)
which satisfies the following equation according to Lemma 4.1
(1 − x1)2 = β12Dˆ2
Dˆ1µ2
x21 +
x1(1−x1)
µ2
[
β12 − Dˆ2µ2
Dˆ1
]
.
If social interactions do contribute to the task allocation, i.e., the full model (15), then the allocation of
the inside colony task x∗1 is determined by the equation (20), i.e.,
(1 − x1)2 = β12Dˆ2
Dˆ1µ2
x21 +
x1(1−x1)
µ2


(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
social interaction
+β12 − Dˆ2µ2
Dˆ1


where the contribution of social interactions to the task allocation follows the equation (13).
Define xNSA1 =
µ2
β1,2µ2
as the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (17) that has
no contribution from social interactions; xSI1 =
1
1+
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
as a threshold determining the effects from social
interactions SI(x1) (13); and x
RA
1 as the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (15)
that has contributions from social interactions. Then we have the following corollary regarding the effects
of social interactions to the task allocation by applying the proof of Theorem 3.3:
Corollary 4.1 (The contribution of social interactions). Let s = m = 2, µ1 < µ2, and assume that
Condition H holds. Then the model (17) has a unique task allocation X∗ =
(
µ2
β1,2+µ2
,
β1,2
β1,2+µ2
)
. Moreover,
the following statements hold:
1. For Model (17), the ratio of the inside colony task allocation to the outside colony task allocation is
µ2
β1,2
.
2. If
β1,2
µ2
< Dˆ2
Dˆ1
holds, then the allocation of the inside task xNSA1 of the model (17) without social inter-
actions is smaller than the allocation of the inside task xR1 of the model (15) with social interactions,
i.e.,
xNSA1 < x
RA
1 < x
SI
1 .
3. If
β1,2
µ2
> Dˆ2
Dˆ1
holds, then the allocation of the inside task xNS1 of the model (17) without social inter-
actions is larger than the allocation of the inside task xR1 of the model (15) with social interactions,
i.e.,
xSI1 < x
RA
1 < x
NSA
1 .
Effects of social interactions among task groups: Corollary 4.1 implies that, in the absence of the
contribution of social interactions to task allocation, the task allocation is completely determined by the
mortality of the outside colony task µ2 and the maturation rate (or the birth rate of the outside colony task
group) β1,2 where the mortality of the inside colony task µ1 and the task demand have no effects.
We can denote
β1,2
µ2
as the relative population of the outside colony task group which the ratio of the
birth rate of the outside colony task group to its mortality; and Dˆ2
Dˆ1
as the relative task demand of the outside
colony task. Corollary 4.1 indicates that if the relative population is less than that the relative demand of
the outside colony task group, then social interactions will regulate outside colony workers back to colony to
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perform the inside colony task to satisfy the demand. However, if the relative population is more than that
the relative demand of the outside colony task group, then social interactions will regulate more workers to
perform outside colony tasks to optimize its investment.
5. Discussion
Evidence of the ecological success of social insects can be found almost everywhere [137]. The orga-
nizations of insect societies, such as, division of labor, task allocation, collective regulation, mass action
responses, have been considered as main reasons for the success [94]. Colony-level patterns including the
sizes of task groups, the patterns of overlap among task groups [133], and short-term task allocation [46],
emerge from the decisions and actions of individual workers. Increasing evidence suggests that although
genetic, physiological and other aspects must be taken into account [76, 90, 96], mechanistic explanations
should be studied together [11, 41, 115]. In this article, we develop a framework of mathematical models
to explore the crucial feedback mechanisms linking both structure and dynamics of task organizations in a
dynamical environment, and investigate the potential underlying processes of task organization as colony
size increases.
Task allocation is assessed by the distribution of number of workers across tasks [57, 58, 134]. Social
insect colonies can rapidly change its task allocation between tasks in response to changes in task need
and/or environment stimuli [39, 91, 50, 122], which has been driven in part by the colony’s social communi-
cations, and the high connectivity of workers across task groups [66, 135]. Depending on the species the tasks
typically include collecting food (forager), feeding and caring for the offspring (broodcare), and defending
the nest against intruders or parasites (soldier). There is an extensive body of empirical work in biology
studying the phenomenon of division of labor in social insect colonies (e.g., [16, 110, 30, 31, 99]), and the
related individual behaviors that could generate the collective division of labor (e.g., [3, 114, 88]). These
empirical work suggested that workers might select and potentially switch tasks based on different features,
including their age [106, 111], social communications with other ants [106, 112, 49], or the internal response
thresholds and the task demands [5, 104]. Our proposed models include these important features.
More precisely, our first general model incorporates three features: (a) the average internal response
threshold for each task (the internal factor); (b) social network communications that could lead to task
switching (the environmental factor); and (c) dynamical changes of task demands (the external factor).
Workers in many social insect species exhibit age polyethism, in which worker task preferences change with
age. It is well-known that age polyethism could constrain the ability of individuals to switch immediately
between tasks. For example, P. californicus workers have a general age transition from in-nest tasks, such
as brood care, to external tasks, including foraging and waste management [113, 61, 20]. In order to under-
stand how age polyethism affect task organization such as division of labor and task allocation in addition
to the three features mentioned earlier, we develop an additional general model with age polyethism that
is modified from the first model. The proposed models are biologically well-defined (see Theorem 3.1 and
Theorem 4.1). We apply our general modeling framework to the cases of the inside colony task versus the
outside colony task. Our analytical study of the models provide important insights on the effects of colony
size, social communication, and age related task preferences on task allocation and division of labor.
When the population growth dynamics of a colony occurs at the comparable time scale of the task allo-
cation, our theoretical results (Theorem 3.2) show that the relative demand and the mortality of tasks would
affect the task allocation in the following way: (1) The inside colony task allocation is above a threshold
that is determined by its mortality and the relative demand. (2) When the colony has higher demand of the
outside task such as foraging, the colony would distribute more workers to the outside colony task despite
that this task has a higher mortality. (3) To optimize the investment of the colony, the colony would decrease
the distribution to a colony task when its mortality increases. For social insect colonies with age polyethism,
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our results (Theorem 4.2) indicate that the maturation time of workers play an important role in shaping
various aspects of task organizations. If the maturation rate is large, then increasing the average mortality
of the outside colony task can increase the inside colony task allocation. Its biological implication is that
the colony will regulate the outside colony workers back to the colony to perform less risky work when the
cost of the outside colony task is too high.
When the time scale of the population growth dynamics is much slower than the task allocation and
the related demand (i.e., the colony size can be considered as constant when study the dynamics of task
allocation), the colony size has a huge impact on the task allocations. Our analysis implies that: When
the colony is at the early ergonomic growth stage (i.e., its size is below a threshold), the colony invests its
resource for the colony growth. As a consequence, the colony requires more workers to perform the outside
colony task such as foraging to support the growth need of the colony. When the colony is at the matured
stage (i.e., its size is above a threshold), the colony shifts more workers to perform the safer task (e.g., the
inside colony task). As a consequence, the allocation of the outside colony task decreases with respect the
colony size. For colonies with age polyethism, the size of the matured colony decreases when the mortality
of the inside colony task (or the maturation rate of the outside colony task) increases.
Our theoretical findings are supported by empirical studies that have showed that the social context,
in particular colony size, influences the ergonomics of insect societies. For instance, colony size shapes the
exploratory and foraging responses in ants, and an increase in worker number triggers the formation of more
efficient foraging networks [3]. In wasps, the delay experienced by workers during transfer of materials for
nest construction decreases with group size due to the reduction of stochastic fluctuations [2]. Increased
colony size can also affect the rate of interactions among workers and thus contribute significantly to the
efficient allocation of individuals to different tasks [93, 89]. For the harvester ant (Pogonomyrmex badius),
in spring, proportion foraging increased due to an increase in forager number and reduction in colony size,
and in late summer, it decreased as colony size increased through new worker birth and a loss of about 3 %
of foragers per day [78]. Moreover, immature colonies (less than 800 workers) reached a higher maximum
proportion foraging than large, mature colonies each year [78].
Social communication in social insect colonies has profound impacts on the organization of task allocation
and division of labor [17, 39, 50]. Empirical work show that direct physical contacts (e.g., antennations) can
generate changes in the number of workers performing a task [47, 48, 93, 98], and almost all work activities,
from task switching to recruitment, to assessment of task needs, require workers to interact with others. Our
analysis (Lemma 3.3) reveals that without the contribution from social interactions, the task allocation is
totally determined by the ratio of the relative mortality to the relative task demand. This ratio could be
considered as the relative cost of the task, thus the larger the ratio, the smaller allocation to the task. In
the presence of the social interaction, our results (Theorem 3.3) imply that the effect of social interactions
is determined by the ratio of the product of the mortality and the relative demand of the inside colony task
to the product of the mortality and the relative demand of the inside colony task. If the ratio is greater
than 1, then social interactions would regulate the outside colony workers back to the colony to perform the
inside colony task. However, if the ratio is less than 1, then social interactions would regulate more workers
to perform the outside colony task due to the large relative demand of the outside colony task.
For the model with temporal polyethism, our work (Corollary 4.1) implies that, in the absence of the
contribution of social interactions, the task allocation is completely determined by the mortality of the out-
side colony task and the maturation rate (or the birth rate of the outside colony task group) where the
mortality of the inside colony task and the task demand have no effects. With the contribution of social
interaction, our analysis indicates that if the relative population is less than that the relative demand of the
outside colony task group, then social interactions will regulate outside colony workers back to colony to
perform the inside colony task to satisfy the demand. However, if the relative population is more than that
the relative demand of the outside colony task group, then social interactions will regulate more workers to
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perform outside colony tasks to optimize its investment.
It has been shown that the efficient organization of work in eusocial insects has attributed greatly in
their outstanding ecological success [92]. A prominent pattern of colony organization is division of labor,
expressed not only between reproductive and worker castes, but also among workers that specialize on dif-
ferent tasks [132, 59, 139]. Non-reproductive division of labor, or polyethism, is thought to enhance colony
performance and ultimately fitness [92, 19] however see [30]. Colonies must balance the putative benefits of
task specialization with the flexibility to reallocate workers in response to changes in task demand, which
depends on variable internal and external factors [12, 46, 110, 57]. The study present in this paper elucidates
how individual task decisions are integrated with a fundamental colony attribute (colony size) and a simple
behavior rule (local social interaction) by using the framework of our proposed models.
It would be interesting to include inactive workers (i.e., workers don’t appear to do anything at all) as an
additional component in our models. The presence of inactive workers in social insect colonies is an another
phenomenon in social insect task allocation even in the field [62, 18], which may be driven in part by selfish
interests, selfishness can at most explain a small fraction of observed inactivity [63]. The recent work shows
that nor do all inactive workers appear to be reserves for defense [64] or for the case of worker loss [99]. The
work of Pinter-Wollman et al. [99] suggests that inactivity may be a side-effect of an imperfect mechanism
for generating individual variation for the purpose of effective task allocation, which is a mathematically
difficult problem [21]. We have an on-going project to investigate potential mechanisms producing inactive
workers in a separate paper.
6. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Since f(N,µ) = µ(b+Ns)− rNs−1, then simple calculations give follows:
f(0, µ) = bµ > 0, and
∂f(N,µ)
∂N
= Ns−2 [sµN − r(s − 1)]
which implies that f(N,µ) has a unique positive critical point Nc(µ) =
r(s−1)
µs
and
∂f
∂N
< 0 if N < Nc(µ);
∂f
∂N
> 0 if N > Nc(µ).
Therefore, if f(Nc(µ), µ) < 0, the it has two positive roots N
± such that f(N±, µ) = 0 with N− < Nc(µ) <
N+.
On the other hand, we have
f(Nc(µ), µ) = bµ+Nc(µ)
s−1(µNc(µ)− r) and ∂f(Nc(µ), µ)
∂µ
= b+Nc(µ)
s > 0
which indicates that
f(Nc(µ1), µ1) ≤ f(Nc(µm), µm) for µ1 ≤ µm.
Therefore, if f(Nc(µm), µm) < 0 then we have f(Nc(µ1), µ1) < 0. Therefore, if f(Nc(µm), µm) < 0, then
there exists N±1 > 0 and N
±
m > 0 such that
f(N±1 , µ1) = f(N
±
m, µm) = 0 and N
−
1 < Nc(µ1) < N
+
1 , N
−
m < Nc(µm) < N
+
m.
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Since f(N,µ) is an increasing function with respect to µ, thus, we can conclude that N−1 < N
−
m < N
+
m ≤ N+1 .
Therefore, the statement holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. For any initial condition taken in Ω, we have follows:
dN
dt
∣∣∣
N=0
= 0,
dxi
dt
∣∣∣
xi=0
=
rNs−1
b+Ns
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
≥ 0, dDi
dt
∣∣∣
Di=0
= γi > 0, i = 1, ..,m
which implies that the model (2) is positively invariant in Ω according to Theorem A.4 (p.423) in [117].
Since
∑m
i=1 xi(0) = 1 and
∑m
i=1 x
′
i = 0, we can conclude that
m∑
i=1
xi(t) = 1 and 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 0.
This implies that
N ′ = N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxj
]
≤ N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns − µ1
]
N ′ = N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns −
∑m
j=1 µjxj
]
≥ N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns − µm
]
D′i = N [γi − αixiDi] ≥ N [γi − αiDi]
.
Assume that all parameters are strictly positive and Condition H holds. Then according to Lemma 3.1,
there exists N±1 and N
±
m such that
f(N±1 , µ1) = f(N
±
m, µm) = 0 and N
−
1 < Nc(µ1) < N
+
1 , N
−
m < Nc(µm) < N
+
m, N
−
1 < N
−
m < N
+
m ≤ N+1 .
This implies that if N(0) < N−1 , then we have
N ′ ≤ N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns
− µm
]
< 0⇒ lim inf
t→∞
N(t) = 0.
If N(0) > N−m, then we have follows by applying inequalities:
0 < N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns
− µ1
]
≤ N ′ ≤ N
[
rNs−1
b+Ns
− µ1
]
⇒ N+m ≤ lim inf
t→∞
N(t) ≤ lim sup
t→∞
N(t) < N+1 .
If Condition H holds, then the inequality D′i ≥ N+m [γi − αiDi] holds which implies that lim inft→∞Di(t) ≥
γi
αi
. On the other hand, we have D′i ≤ N+1 γi which gives Di(t) ≤ γit+Di(0). Therefore, we have:
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
≥
γi
αiθi∑
k
γkt+Dk(0)
θk
=
γi
αiθi
γt+ a
.
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Let M = minN+m≤N≤N+1 {
rNs−1
b+Ns }, then we have
dxi
dt
= rN
s−1
b+Ns
[
Di
θi∑
k
Dk
θk
− xi
]
+
xi
[
Di
θi
−∑j Djθj xj
]
∑
k
Dk
θk
− µixi + xi
∑m
j=1 µjxj
≥ M
[
γi
αiθi
γt+a − xi
]
+ xi
[
γi
αiθi
γt+a − 1− µi + µ1
]
which implies that xi is persistent, i.e., there exists ǫi > 0 such that:
lim inf
t→∞
xi(t) ≥ ǫ for all i = 1, ...,m.
This indicates that D′i ≤ N+1 [γi − αiǫiDi] holds. Therefore, we have lim supt→∞Di(t) ≤ γiαiǫ < DM for all
i = 1..m.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Let f1(x1) = [1− x1]2 where f1(x1) ≥ 0 is a decreasing function in x1 when x1 ∈ [0, 1] and f1(0) =
1, f1(1) = 0. And let
f2(x1) =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 +
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1
]
.
We denote f(x1) as follows:
f(x1) = f1(x1)− f2(x1) = c3x31 + c2x22 + c1x1 + c0
where
c3 =
1+
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
µ2
, c0 = 1
c2 =
(µ2−2)− Dˆ2
Dˆ1
(1+µ1)
µ2
, c1 =
1−2µ2
µ2
with f(0) = c0 = 1 > 0, f(1) = −µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
< 0.
Notice that the function f(x1) is a polynomial with degree 3, the coefficient of the degree 3 is c3 =
1+
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
µ2
>
0, f(0) = c0 = 1 > 0, f(1) = −µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
< 0. This implies that has one negative root and two positive roots where
one is greater than 1 and the other is between (0, 1). Therefore, f(x1) has a unique positive root x
∗
1 ∈ (0, 1).
This implies that if the equilibrium (N∗, X∗, D∗) exists, then (X∗, D∗) =
(
x∗1, 1− x∗1, γ1x∗1α1 ,
γ2
(1−x∗1)α2
)
;
and N∗± =
r±
√
r2−4bµ2
2µ with µ = µ1x
∗
1 + µ2(1 − x∗1). Since Condition H holds and µ1 < µ2, then ac-
cording to Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.1, we can conclude that N∗+ ∈
(
r+
√
r2−4bµ22
2µ2
,
r+
√
r2−4bµ21
2µ1
)
and
N∗− ∈
(
r−
√
r2−4bµ21
2µ1
,
r−
√
r2−4bµ22
2µ2
)
. Moreover, we have
∂N∗+
∂µ
= −r(r +
√
r2 − 4bµ2)
2µ2
√
r2 − 4bµ2 < 0,
∂µ
∂x∗1
= µ1 − µ2 < 0, ∂µ
∂µ1
= x∗1 > 0, and
∂µ
∂µ2
= 1− x∗1 > 0
which implies that N∗+ is an increasing function of x
∗
1, and it is a decreasing function of x
∗
2, respectively.
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According to Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.1, we know that the total population N of the model (2) con-
verges to 0 whenever N < N∗−, this implies that the equilibrium (N
∗
−, X
∗, D∗) is unstable.
Let rd = Dˆ2
Dˆ1
. Recall that
f2(x1) =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 +
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1
]
= − (1 + rd)x1
µ2
[
x21 − b1x1 + b0
]
where b1 = 1 +
1+rdµ1
1+rd and b0 =
1
1+rd . Since b
2
1 > 4b0 > 0, we can conclude that f2(x1) has zero and two
positive number xˆi, i = 1, 2 where xˆ1 + xˆ2 = b1 > 1 and xˆ1xˆ2 = b0 < 1. This implies that f2(x1) has a
unique positive root xˆ1 =
b1−
√
b21−4b0
2 =
rd(1+µ1)+2−
√
rd2(1+µ1)2+4rdµ1
2(1+rd) ∈ (0, 1) where
f2(x1) < 0 if 0 < x1 < xˆ1 and f2(x1) > 0 if xˆ1 < x1 < 1.
Since f1 is strictly positive and decreasing in (0, 1) and f = f1 − f2 has a unique positive root x∗1 ∈ (0.1),
therefore, we can conclude that x∗1 > xˆ1.
In addition, the function f2(x1) is an increasing function with respect to rd =
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, µ1, and is decreasing
with respect to µ2. This implies that increasing the value of rd or µ1, the intercept of f2(x1) = f1(x1) is
decreasing, i.e., the unique positive solution x∗1 of f2(x1) = f1(x1) is decreasing with respect to rd, and µ1,
respectively. Similarly, we can conclude that the unique positive solution x∗1 of f2(x1) = f1(x1) is increasing
with respect to µ2. This also implies that
dN∗+
dµ1
=
∂N∗+
∂µ
∂µ
∂µ1
+
∂N∗+
∂µ
∂µ
∂x∗1
∂x∗1
∂µ1
< 0
and
∂N∗+
∂rd
=
∂N∗+
∂µ
∂µ
∂x∗1
∂x∗1
∂rd
< 0.
Therefore, the total population N∗+ is a decreasing function of µ1 and rd =
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, respectively. Hence, the
statements hold.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. Let xNS1 =
1
1+
√
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
be the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (8) that has
no contribution from social interactions, then we have
[
1− xNS1
]2
=
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
(xNS1 )
2.
Let xSI1 =
1
1+
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
be a positive root of the contribution function SI(x1) of social interactions to the task
allocation, i.e.,
SI(x1) =
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(
1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
)
x1 − 1
]
.
Then we have
SI(x1) > 0 when 1 > x1 > x
SI
1 ; SI(x1) < 0 when x1 < x
SI
1 .
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Based on the proof of Theorem 3.2, we have f1(x1) = [1− x1]2 where f1(x1) ≥ 0 is a decreasing function in
x1 when x1 ∈ [0, 1] and f1(0) = 1, f1(1) = 0; and f2(x1) = µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 + SI(x1) with f2(0) = 0; f2(1) =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
.
Let xR1 be the inside colony task allocation of the task organization model (2) that has contributions from
social interactions, then it is a unique positive root in (0, 1) of the following equation
f1(x1) = f2(x1) =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 + SI(x1).
If µ1
µ2
> Dˆ2
Dˆ1
, then we can conclude that
1 +
√
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
> 1 +
Dˆ2
Dˆ1
⇔ xNS1 =
1
1 +
√
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
< xSI1 =
1
1 + Dˆ2
Dˆ1
.
This also implies that
f2(x1) =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 + SI(x1) <
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 when x1 < x
SI
1
and
f2(x1) =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 + SI(x1) >
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 when 1 > x1 > x
SI
1 > x
NS
1 .
Notice that f1(x1) is decreasing in (0, 1); and
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
x21 is increasing in (0, 1), and f1(x
NS
1 ) =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
(xNS1 )
2.
Then we can conclude that f2(x
NS
1 ) < f1(x
NS
1 ) =
µ1Dˆ2
µ2Dˆ1
(xNS1 )
2 and f2(x
SI
1 ) > f1(x
SI
1 ). This indicates that
f2(x1) = f1(x1) has a unique positive root x
R
1 ∈ (xNS1 , xSI1 ) ⊂ (0, 1) based on Theorem 3.2.
Similarly, we can show that xSI1 < x
R
1 < x
NS
1 when
µ1
µ2
< Dˆ2
Dˆ1
holds. Therefore, the statement holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. Most of statements in Theorem 4.2 can apply similar arguments in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Thus,
we omit the details except item 2 and 3.
Recall that f1(x1) = (1 − x1)2. Let rd = Dˆ2
Dˆ1
and
g2(x1) =
β1,2rd
µ2
x21 +
x1(1− x1)
µ2
[(1 + rd) x1 − 1 + β1,2 − µ2rd] = − (1 + rd)x1
µ2
[
x21 − a1x1 + a0
]
where a1 = 1+
rd(µ2+β1,2)+1−β1,2
1+rd and a0 =
1+rdµ2−β1,2
1+rd . Then f1−g2 has a unique positive solution x∗1 ∈ (0, 1)
by applying the argument in Theorem 3.2.
If 1 + rdµ2 − β1,2 > 0, then a0 > 0 which implies that g(x1) ≈ −a0x1 < 0 when x1 is small. Notice
that g2(x1) is a degree three polynomial with its coefficient of the degree being negative, g2(0) = 0 and
g2(1) > 0, then we can deduce that g2(x1) has zero and two positive number xˆi, i = 1, 2 where xˆ2 > 1 and
xˆ1 =
a1−
√
a21−4a0
2 ∈ (0, 1). This indicates that
g2(x1) < 0 if 0 < x1 < xˆ1 and g2(x1) > 0 if xˆ1 < x1 < 1.
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Since f1(x1) = (1 − x1)2 is strictly positive and decreasing from 1 to 0 when x1 is increasing from 0 to 1,
thus the unique solution x∗1 > xˆ1 when β1,2 < 1 + rdµ2.
If 1+rdµ2−β1,2 < 0, i.e., β1,2 > 1+rdµ2, then g2(x1) has a unique positive root xˆ2 = a1+
√
a21−4a0
2 and a
unique negative root xˆ1 =
a1−
√
a21−4a0
2 where g2(x1) > 0 if 0 < x1 < xˆ2. Recall that g2(x1) is a degree three
polynomial with its coefficient of the degree being negative, g2(0) = 0 and g2(1) > 0, then we can conclude
that xˆ2 > 1, thus g2(x1) > 0 for all x1 ∈ (0, 1) when β1,2 > 1 + rdµ2.
In addition, the function g2(x1) is an increasing function with respect to β1,2 since
∂g2(x1)
∂β1,2
=
x1(rd+ (1− x1))
µ2
> 0.
If β1,2 > 1 + rdµ2, then the discussion above implies that g2(x1) > 0 for all x1 ∈ (0, 1). Notice that
∂g2(x1)
∂µ2
= −g2(x1)
µ22
− rdβ1,2x
2
1
µ2
< 0,
therefore g2(x1) is decreasing with respect to µ2 when β1,2 > 1 + rdµ2 holds.
Since f1(x1) is decreasing in x1, the argument above implies that increasing the value of β1,2, the intercept
of g2(x1) = f1(x1) is decreasing, i.e., the unique positive solution x
∗
1 of g2(x1) = f1(x1) is decreasing with
respect to β1,2. Similarly, we can conclude that the unique positive solution x
∗
1 of g2(x1) = f1(x1) is increasing
with respect to µ2 when β1,2 > 1 + rdµ2 holds. This also implies that
dN∗+
dµ1
=
∂N∗+
∂µ
∂µ
∂µ1
+
∂N∗+
∂µ
∂µ
∂x∗1
∂x∗1
∂µ1
< 0,
∂N∗+
∂β1,2
=
∂N∗+
∂µ
∂µ
∂x∗1
∂x∗1
∂β1,2
< 0.
Therefore, the total population N∗+ is a decreasing function of β1,2 and µ1, respectively. Hence, the state-
ments hold.
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